Risto

Something I occasionally reflect on while reading Chomsky is the fact that he does not believe in the supernatural, but he doesn't discuss it, unless asked specific questions during interviews. What's interesting here is that every intonation of every syllable of every word that he speaks or writes is exceptionally informed, and he is arguably one of the most informed people in the history of the planet. The essay writer includes only thoughts relevant to their thesis, and Chomsky expresses only thoughts essential in progressing towards what he perceives as a higher social utility. From this we might say that Chomsky views the discussion of disbelief as inutile.

While it's patently obvious that talking about nuclear disarmament is more important than debating the merits of consubstantiation over transubstantiation, my suspicion is that Chomsky avoids supernatural debate also because such topics are better left in the realm of personal philosophy. It seems to me that in this way, he steers clear of impediments that might obscure the topic at hand or diminish the logical capacities of both himself and his audience. As regards his lecture technique, Chomsky himself has stated "I'm a boring speaker and I like it that way ... I doubt that people are attracted to whatever the persona is ... People are interested in the issues, and they're interested in the issues because they are important."

In considering the relationship between religion and social utility, I was recently discussing social change with a colleague of mine, and he noted that amongst all major institutions, private or public, religious institutions are perhaps best situated to instigate and propagate widespread social change. What then are Dawkins, Hitchens, and Harris carrying on about? I don't know that they would place the importance and relevance of their theological criticisms on quite the same level as the works of Chomsky, but in any case it's an important issue, determining which battles to fight, and how to fight them. As far as devising a strategy for engendering mutual respect and fomenting critical thought: is the world at large ready for militant atheism or is pluralistic pragmatism a more realistic approach to creating an environment in which we can all work together to solve human problems? Both approaches require laborious intellectual effort, and both require us to question our most fundamental beliefs about nature, man, and society. The first however attacks metaphysical ideology, while the second attacks political ideology.

Of course, the political freedoms that Chomsky fights for must be in place for us to even discuss the philosophical positions that Dawkins asks us to consider. When reflecting on the current state of the world, if we want to improve things for everyone, does it make sense to focus on attempting to secularize, for example, a powerful and affluent Christian democrat in the United States? Or, would it be more useful to focus on depoliticizing them? Might secularizing a politician in the first world improve material conditions in the third world? How much does it matter if the politician thinks that God helped them win a presidential election? Is it possible to put that question aside and work together to alleviate famine in Ethiopia? Are the decisions and actions of the theistic democrat governed by his religious beliefs in such a manner that he is rendered unable to seriously consider the plight of the Ethiopians? Respectively, are the decisions and actions of the affluent democrat governed by his political beliefs in such a manner that he is rendered unable to make any serious efforts toward relieving the plight of the Ethiopians?

Political freedom must be in place for philosophical freedom to survive, however the two are connected, and grow together. Both play a role in shaping our perspectives and beliefs, regardless of the degree to which they are developed -- or undeveloped, which is precisely the problem. Which is more important to pursue? The advancement of philosophical awareness, or the advancement of political awareness? Neither is intrinsically moral, and neither can guarantee ethical behaviour. But might one be a better basis for establishing a humanistic and objective critical mindset?

Are people in the first world more likely to help Ethiopians if they are convinced that the invisible hand of God does not exist, or are people in the first world more likely to help Ethiopians if they are convinced that the invisible hand of the free market does not exist?